Calomiris interviewed by Romesh Vaitilingam

The puzzling pervasiveness of dysfunctional banking
March 21, 2014

Calomiris talks to Romesh Vaitilingam about how politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation and why banking systems are unstable in some countries but not in others. Calomiris also presents his analysis of the political and banking history of the UK and how the well-being of banking systems depends on complex bargains and coalitions between politicians, bankers and other stakeholders. The interview was recorded in London in February 2014.


RSA Event

Calomiris speaks at RSA
February 27, 2014

Charles W. Calomiris, Henry Kaufman Professor of Financial Institutions at Columbia Business School, visits the RSA to reveal the extent to which politics influences a country’s banking system. He argues that chronic banking crises are not accidents due to unforeseen circumstances, but rather, are the result of complex bargains made between politicians, bankers and other interest groups. And, in fact, financial institutions are often made fragile by design.


Calomiris and Haber on EconTalk

Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber talk with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about their book, Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit. The conversation focuses on how politics and economics interact to give some countries such as Canada a remarkably stable financial system while others such as the United States have a much less stable system. The two authors discuss the political forces that explain the persistence of seemingly bad financial regulation. The conversation includes a discussion of the financial crisis of 2008.

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